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ENTITLED AS AGAINST NONE: HOW THE WRONGLY
DECIDED CROKER ISLAND CASE PERPETUATES
ABORIGINAL DISPOSSESSION
Siiri Aileen Wilson†
Abstract: Australia’s 1992 landmark case of Mabo v. The State of Queensland
[No. 2] revoked the concept of terra nullius and for the first time since European
colonization of the continent allowed indigenous Australians to obtain legal ownership of
their traditional lands. The following year this groundbreaking decision became statutory
law with the enactment of the Native Title Act (NTA) of 1993. The case law and the
statutory act both failed, however, to adequately address the question of Aboriginal
claims to sea properties. For many Australian Aboriginal groups, ownership of
traditional lands does not abruptly end at a shoreline but extends to surrounding coast
lines, intertidal zones, and offshore seas. This indigenous view is in stark contrast to
Western concepts of property that have resulted in distinct bodies of law governing rights
to the ownership of land versus rights to the ownership of sea.
The NTA recognizes exclusive Aboriginal property rights whether the traditional
area is a land or sea property. The first case to test native title rights to sea property, The
Commonwealth of Australia v. Yarmirr (“Croker Island”) held, however, that native title
can be recognized without the right to exclude. This precedential decision continues to
bar exclusive Aboriginal ownership of sea properties and denies Aboriginal management
of natural resources of the sea regardless of whether the group provides historical
evidence of ownership and management. This Comment argues that the Croker Island
decision does not comply with the NTA, is based in an erroneous understanding of
Aboriginal law and custom, and should be overturned. This Comment further argues that
where an Aboriginal group successfully provides evidentiary proof of a traditionally
practiced right to exclude, native title must recognize and protect an exclusionary right to
traditional sea properties. Granting ownership of traditionally held properties is central to
rectifying harms caused by Australia’s historic policy of dispossession of Aboriginal
properties and is necessary to promote Aboriginal sovereignty.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The December 3, 2007 inauguration1 of Australian Prime Minister
Kevin Rudd renewed hope that national reconciliation between Aboriginal
Australians and white Australians could begin anew.2
Australia’s
†
Juris doctor expected in 2009, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professor Robert Anderson for generously giving his time and advice; Executive Comments Editor
Karen Clevering for her endless encouragement, support, and hard work; and Christopher Parker, PhC., for
sharing his expertise on Australian Aboriginal concepts of property. The author would additionally like to
thank Mr. Vivian Sinnamon and the Kokoberra, Kokominjena, and Kunjen people of Kowanyama, in
particular, Ms. Priscilla Major, for their generosity and friendship.
1
Prime Minister of Australia, About Your PM, http://www.pm.gov.au/your_pm/index.cfm (last
visited Sept. 18, 2008).
2
See Nick Squires, New PM Kevin Rudd to apologise to Aborigines, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
ONLINE, Nov. 27, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1570584/New-PM-Kevin-Rudd-toapologise-to-Aborigines.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2008) (describing not only Rudd’s campaign promise to
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Parliament first actively promoted reconciliation in 19913 after the Royal
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody4 argued that Australia's
history of Aboriginal land dispossession produced the current state of
indigenous disadvantage.5 The Australian government’s historic practice of
dispossession created a cycle of poverty, poor health, and limited
educational opportunities that trapped Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Australians in an existence very different from other Australians.6 The
report urged all political leaders and their parties to achieve reconciliation
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities and to end community
division and discord, as well as injustice towards Aboriginal people.7
Prime Minister Rudd made reconciliation a central promise of his
election campaign.8 For some, Mr. Rudd’s speech on February 13, 2008, at
the Commencement of the 42nd Parliament fulfilled this promise. On that
historic day, Mr. Rudd delivered an official apology to all Indigenous
Australians for the past injustices they suffered at the hands of the Australian
government.9 Mr. Rudd promised to achieve reconciliation for all
Australians and to create a future based in mutual respect, mutual resolve,
and mutual responsibility.10 This goal, he said, would be achieved by
promote reconciliation, but also former Prime Minister John Howard’s standing refusal to apologize for the
government’s historic policy of dispossession and the Stolen Generation).
3
The Australian government passed the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act in 1991.
Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Law, http://www.comlaw.gov.au (Quick Search for
“Aboriginal Reconciliation Act”) (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). The Act created a ten-year Reconciliation
Council to improve relationships between Aboriginal and European Australians. Id. The Act, and the
Council, ceased in 2001. See id.
4
See generally Australasian Legal Information Institute, The Final Report of The Royal
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/rciadic/index.html (last
visited Oct. 27, 2008). Between October 1987 and November 1990, the Royal Commission into Aboriginal
Deaths in Custody investigated the deaths of ninety-nine Aboriginal persons in police and prison custody.
Kathy Whimp, Final Report of the Royal Commission Into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody—Summary,
Summary, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/rciadic/rciadic_summary/rcsumk01.html (Nov. 30,
2008). The Commission required investigation and reporting on the underlying social, cultural, and legal
issues behind the deaths as well as the immediate circumstances surrounding them. Id.
5
Whimp, supra note 4, at Part C, Ch. 19.
6
The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Finding Common Ground: Towards a Document for
Reconciliation, 2. Reconciliation: A brief look at a long history, http://austlii.law.uts.edu.au/
au/orgs/car/docrec/relevant/docbook/p3.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2008). The disparity between Aboriginal
Australians and their European counterparts is readily seen in their distinct life expectancies, to name but
one example. See Jenna Gruenstein, Australia’s Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act:
Addressing Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Inequities At The Expense of International Human Rights?, 17
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 467, 467 (2008).
7
Id.
8
See Squires, supra note 2.
9
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, Speech at the Commencement of the 42nd Australian House of
Parliament, Apology to Australia’s Indigenous People (Feb. 13, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/Rudd_Speech.pdf (last visited Sept 18, 2008)).
10
Id.
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creating “a future where all Australians, whatever their origins, are truly
equal partners, with equal opportunities and with an equal stake in shaping
the next chapter in the history of this great country.”11
Increasing Aboriginal ownership of traditionally held properties is
critical to rectifying the harms caused by the Australian government’s policy
of dispossession. The historic case of Mabo v. The State of Queensland [No.
2]12 was the first step in establishing a form of Aboriginal title to property
that was legally recognized and protected by the Australian government.
Since the High Court of Australia13 (“High Court”) handed down its ruling
in that historic case, however, legal recognition for Aboriginal ownership of
traditionally held properties has only become more elusive and more
difficult to obtain. Nowhere is this more evident than for Aboriginal
communities seeking recognition of rights in traditional sea properties. In
the latest native title sea claim to reach the Federal Court, Gumana v.
Northern Territory,14 ownership of offshore sea properties was easily and
summarily denied15 based on precedent set by the High Court in the 2001
case of The Commonwealth of Australia v. Yarmirr and Others (“Croker
Island”).16
Correcting the past injustices produced by Aboriginal dispossession of
traditional properties requires revisiting the history of native title and its
steady erosion from a mechanism for recognizing Aboriginal ownership to a
mechanism for further dispossession. Such a review reveals that in the
Croker Island case, the High Court erroneously applied the framework for
determination of Aboriginal ownership of property. The same review
further reveals that the Croker Island precedent erroneously interpreted the
Aboriginal traditional law and custom that, as mandated by statute, defines
native title rights.
This Comment argues that the Croker Island decision should be
overturned in order to rectify the continuing dispossession of Aboriginal
property. As it stands, this precedential decision negates the purpose of the

11

Id.
Mabo and Other Plaintiffs v. the State of Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
The High Court of Australia, which consists of a chief justice and six associate justices, is the
country’s supreme court and the final court of appeal for both the federal and state court systems. See High
Court of Australia, Current Members of the High Court, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/justices_01.html (last
visited Oct. 28, 2008) (listing the names of the Chief Justice and the six associate Justices).
14
Gumana v. Northern Territory (2007) 158 F.C.R 349.
15
Id. at 395 (explaining that the Gumana claim need not be analyzed as the High Court had already
determined that Native Title is inconsistent with the public right of access to fishing and navigation).
16
The Commonwealth of Australia v. Yarmirr and Others (2001) 208 C.L.R. 1, 85 [hereinafter
Yarmirr].
12
13
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Native Title Act (“NTA”)17 and continues to prevent the legal ownership of
traditional sea properties that the NTA sought to effectuate. Part II analyzes
the creation of native title as an exclusive property right to traditionally held
land and sea properties. Part III elucidates how the subsequent decision in
The Wik Peoples v. The State of Queensland18 and the Native Title Act
Amendments19 began eroding this exclusive property right by first creating a
model of shared or coexistent rights and then limiting the types of land that
Aboriginal people can claim. Part IV explains how the High Court wrongly
decided the Croker Island case and created the untenable precedent of an
entirely non-exclusive right to sea property. Part V argues that, had the High
Court reviewed the factual record in Croker Island, the Court would have
correctly found evidence of the Aboriginal exercise of the right to exclude
that supports recognizing an exclusionary property right. Finally, Part VI
argues that the Croker Island decision must be overturned in order to
effectuate the purpose of the NTA, rectify the historic practice of
dispossession, and promote Aboriginal sovereignty.
II.

NATIVE TITLE CREATED AN EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY RIGHT FOR
TRADITIONALLY HELD ABORIGINAL LAND AND SEA PROPERTIES

For Aboriginal Australians, ownership of traditionally held land and
sea properties only recently became a viable reality. The historical roots of
the indigenous struggle for land rights begin in 1788 when Great Britain lay
claim to Australia upon “discovery” of the continent.20 At the time of their
arrival in Sydney Cove, British naval forces landed on a continent
containing an estimated 750,000 native inhabitants.21
Despite this
impressive native presence, the British declared the continent terra nullius,
or unoccupied territory belonging to no one.22 This colonial ideology
prevented Aboriginal ownership of land for the next two hundred years.23

17
The Native Title Act 1993, 1993 (Austl.) (Cth), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au (Quick
Search for “Native Title Act 1993,” choose “Native Title Act 1993”) (“An Act about native title in relation
to land or waters, and for related purposes”) [hereinafter The NTA]. The NTA codified the decision of the
High Court of Australia in Mabo and created a framework for legal recognition of Aboriginal ownership of
property. See PETER H. RUSSELL, RECOGNIZING ABORIGINAL TITLE: THE MABO CASE AND INDIGENOUS
RESISTANCE TO ENGLISH-SETTLER COLONIALISM 287-88 (University of Toronto Press 2005).
18
The Wik Peoples v. The State of Queensland and Others (1996) 187 C.L.R. 1.
19
The NTA was significantly amended in 1998 in response to the Wik decision. See infra Part III.
20
DAVID ANDREW ET AL., ABORIGINAL AUSTRALIA AND THE TORRES STRAIT ISLANDS 24 (2001).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Kamal Puri, Copyright Protection for Aborigines, in MABO: A JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 146, 87
(Maragaret Anne Stephenson & Suri Ratnapala eds., 1993).
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Not until 1992 did the landmark case of Mabo revoke terra nullius and
create native title law, or indigenous land ownership and property rights.24
The revocation of terra nullius created an opening for Aboriginal
Australians to establish exclusive property rights in traditionally held land
and sea properties. The federal NTA in 1993 quickly followed the ruling in
Mabo.25 Together, Mabo and the NTA created a new body of law,
Australian Native Title, and gave the indigenous people of Australia legal
recourse in their fight to obtain sovereignty over traditionally held
properties.
A.

The Mabo Case Overturned Terra Nullius and Created an Exclusive
Property Right for Aboriginal People

Native title is a proprietary right to traditionally held Aboriginal land
and sea property that is legally recognizable when shown to predate the 1788
acquisition of the Australian continent by Great Britain.26 Proprietary
property rights generally include the right to use and enjoy one’s property, to
alienate one’s property, and to exclude others from the property.27 Prior to
the landmark decision in Mabo the indigenous people of Australia possessed
no inherent or preexisting legal rights to land under Australian law.28
Aboriginal possession and occupation of traditionally held land and sea
properties did not, however, cease during the intervening years between
1788 and 1992. Instead, Aboriginal people lived and fought for recognition
of their land and sea rights all the while possessing what Aboriginal activist
Noel Pearson has called, “204 Years of Invisible Title.”29
The Australian government perpetuated the concept of terra nullius—
that the Australian continent was uninhabited at the time of European
contact—to deny Aboriginal people the right to ownership of their
traditional lands. Eddie Mabo, David Passi, and James Rice, three members
of the Meriam people who traditionally occupied the Murray Islands of the
Torres Strait, successfully challenged this legal fiction in 1982 by suing the
State of Queensland and the Commonwealth of Australia.30 Acting on
24

Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 40-43.
The NTA, supra note 17.
26
See ANDREW ET AL., supra note 20, at 23-29.
27
See Janice Grey, Is Native Title a Proprietary Right?, 9 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J. L. ¶ 1, ¶ 20
(2002) (Issue 3), http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v9n3/gray93.html (last visited Nov. 14 2008).
28
Noel Pearson, 204 Years of Invisible Title: From the Most Vehement Denial of A People’s Rights
to Land to a Most Cautious and Belated Recognition, in MABO: A JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 75, 75 (Maragaret
Anne Stephenson & Suri Ratnapala eds., 1993).
29
Id.
30
Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 3.
25
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behalf of all indigenous Meriam, Mabo claimed that the Crown’s
sovereignty over the islands of the Strait was subject to and burdened by the
land rights of the Meriam based upon local custom and traditional native
title.31 In filing the case in the High Court, Mabo sought a declaration that
the Meriam “are (a) owners by custom; (b) holders of traditional native title;
and (c) holders of usufructuary rights with respect to their respective
lands.”32 Mabo further sought a declaration to establish that the Meriam’s
native title rights had not been impaired by subsequent acts of the State since
the acquisition of sovereignty.33
The State of Queensland responded to Mabo’s legal challenge and
enacted the Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory Act of 1985 (“Declaratory
Act”).34 Under the Declaratory Act, the State of Queensland annexed all
islands of the Torres Strait at the moment of statehood in 1879,
extinguishing all previously existing rights, interests, or claims to the land.35
The State argued that Australian law followed the precept that with the
acquisition of state sovereignty came the ownership of all lands within the
boundaries of the state.36 As such, there was no room for the common law
to recognize a preexisting indigenous law that conferred native title.37
In 1989, the High Court overturned the Declaratory Act as a violation
of the federal Racial Discrimination Act (“RDA”), rejecting Queensland’s
supposition and upholding Mabo’s claim to native title over the Murray
Islands of the Torres Strait.38 Enacted in 1975, the RDA, cited as Australia’s
first national human rights legislation,39 declares it:
Unlawful for a person to do any act involving a distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour,
descent or national origin which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise,
on an equal footing, of any human right or fundamental

31

Id. at 4.
Id.
33
See id. at 5.
34
HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Landmark Cases Under the Racial
Discrimination Act, in VOICES OF AUSTRALIA: EDUCATION MODULE 39, 40 (2007) available at
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/education/voices/pdf/a5_landmark_cases.pdf (disscussing the role of the 1985
Queensland Coast Island Declaratory Act in Mabo) [hereinafter HREOC RDA Cases].
35
Id.
36
See Grey, supra note 27, at ¶ 4.
37
Id.
38
HREOC RDA Cases, supra note 34, at 40.
39
RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 52.
32
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freedom in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other
field of public life.40
The justices of the High Court found that “the right to be immune from
arbitrary deprivation of property is a human right . . . and falls within section
9 of the [Racial Discrimination] Act.”41
Two findings in Mabo established that neither the federal
Commonwealth nor the State had extinguished the Meriam people’s native
title. First, the High Court found the Declaratory Act unconstitutional. In
arguing their claim before the High Court of Australia, the State of
Queensland stipulated that the plaintiffs’ native title claims existed unless
the Declaratory Act extinguished their claims.42 The State’s own stipulation
recognized that the Meriam people practiced a system of land ownership
prior to European colonization that undermined Australia’s long-held legal
doctrine of terra nullius.43 Relying on this logic, the High Court found that,
under Australian common law, indigenous people have the right to legal
recognition as the proprietary owners of their traditional lands.44 On June 3,
1992, ten years after the Mabo case was first filed, the High Court of
Australia held that “the Meriam people are entitled as against the whole
world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of the
Murray Islands.”45
Second, in deciding Mabo, the High Court revoked the doctrine of
terra nullius, further establishing that neither the Commonwealth nor the
State had extinguished the Meriam people’s native title.46 The High Court
legally recognized exclusive rights to traditionally held Aboriginal land and
sea property because Aboriginal property rights both predated and survived
European colonization.47 This ruling created a cause of action for
indigenous Australians to pursue legal claims to ownership of traditionally
held properties.48 In creating this common law action, the High Court
declared that only two exceptions would prevent native title recognition: 1)
where to do so would “fracture a skeletal principle of [the] legal system,”49
or 2) where recognition of title would be “so repugnant to natural justice,
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

The Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, § 9(1) (Cth.).
Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 216.
See RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 208.
See id. at 215.
Id. at 210-11.
Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 2.
See id. at 68-69.
See id. at 69.
Id. at 113 (discussing the judicial relief available to native title holders denied rightful ownership).
Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 43.
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Without proof of one of these two

The Native Title Act Codified Exclusive Property Rights in Aboriginal
Land and Sea Properties

In 1993, the NTA codified and confirmed the exclusive property
rights of Aboriginal people to their traditional land and sea properties only
one year after the High Court’s landmark decision in Mabo. According to
the NTA’s Preamble, the legislation seeks “to rectify the consequences of
past injustices . . . [by] securing the adequate advancement and protection of
Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders.”51 The NTA aims to
accomplish this advancement by ensuring that “Aboriginal peoples and
Torres Strait Islanders receive the full recognition and status within the
Australian nation to which history, their prior rights and interests, and their
rich and diverse culture, fully entitle them to aspire.”52
The NTA establishes the framework for obtaining exclusive property
rights to traditionally held land and sea properties. It defines native title as
“the communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters,” including
protection of the rights to hunt, gather, and fish.53 Section 223 of the NTA
creates a tripartite system for establishing native title “rights and interests”
capable of recognition under the Act.54 All Aboriginal groups claiming
native title ownership to land or sea property must demonstrate that their
rights and interests: a) are possessed under relevant traditional laws and
customs, b) have by law and custom a connection to the place in which the
rights and interests are said to exist, and c) are capable of recognition under
the common law of Australia.55 Sections 223(a) and (b) are understood to
encompass the core requirements56 that must be factually proven, while

50

Id. at 61.
The NTA at Preamble.
52
Id.
53
Id. § 223.
54
Id. § 223(1)(a)-(c).
55
Id.
56
Justice Robert French, Western Australia v. Ward: Devils (and Angels) in the Detail, 7 AUSTL.
INDIGENOUS L. REP. 1 (2002) (Issue 3), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AILR/
2002/38.html (original paper presented at the 2002 Native Title Conference in Geraldton, Western
Australia).
51
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section (c) provides that proven rights will be recognized unless antithetical
to a fundamental tenet of the common law.57
To obtain native title, Aboriginal claimants must first prove that they
have continually maintained a traditional association with the land or sea
property that they are claiming because the NTA does not automatically
recognize Aboriginal property rights.58 In order to obtain legal recognition
of the property rights conferred under the NTA, Aboriginal groups must
negotiate a complex filing process initiated by applying to either the
National Native Title Tribunal (“National Tribunal”) or an approved state or
territory tribunal.59 The government body created by the NTA, the National
Tribunal, is the first arbiter of all native title claims.60
Aboriginal groups must further prove that no contravening property
claims extinguish61 their title and must identify all other existing interests in
the claimed property.62 Aboriginal groups bear this burden of proof because
native title persists until extinguished by the clear and plain intent of the
sovereign.63 When a land holder or the State contests a native title claim, the
National Tribunal will first attempt to mediate between the two parties.64
Native title claims not resolved in mediation are referred to Federal Court
for trial.65
III.

INDUSTRY LOBBYING THREATENS, AND ULTIMATELY ERODES, NATIVE
TITLE’S EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY RIGHT

Since the enactment of the NTA, industry lobbyists and conservative
politicians have continually attacked and successfully eroded native title’s
exclusive property right.66 In The Wik Peoples v. Queensland67 (“Wik”), the
57
The National Native Title Tribunal, Yorta Yorta High Court Appeal, NAT’L NATIVE TITLE HOT
SPOTS NO. 3, at 4 (Dec. 2002), available at http://www.nntt.gov.au/News-and-Communications/
Newsletters/Native-title-Hot-Spots-archive/Documents/Hot_Spots_Number_3.pdf.
58
See Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v. Victoria (2002) 194 A.L.R. 538, 423,
462-63.
59
RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 308.
60
The NTA §107.
61
Extinguishment is the destruction or cancellation of a right, power, contract, or estate. BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 405 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991).
62
RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 308.
63
See Fejo v. Northern Territory (1998) 195 C.L.R. 96, 102.
64
RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 308.
65
The Federal Court of Australia, http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/litigants/native/litigants_nt_what.html
(last visited Sept. 20, 2008) (explaining that native title claims that fail mediation are referred to the federal
court of the state or territory in which the claim was first filed).
66
Tyson Yunkaporta, Land Rights Australia: Extinguishment of Native Title and Ongoing Attacks on
Aboriginal Land Rights, http://aboriginalrights.suite101.com/article.cfm/land_rights_australia (last visited
Sept. 20, 2008).
67
The Wik Peoples v. The State of Queensland and Others (1996) 187 C.L.R. 1.
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High Court presented the pastoralist68 industry with a compromise:
coexistent rights to property where both native title and Crown-granted
leases overlap.69 Following Wik, the 1998 Amendments to the NTA further
limited native title land claims.70 Native title that predates Australian
sovereignty calls into question and threatens the validity of all titles and
privileges granted by the British Crown in the two hundred years since
initial colonization.71 In Western Australia, this realization resulted in talk
of secession from the Commonwealth.72 The mining industry similarly
prophesized doom for the national economy.73 Talk of secession and
predictions of economic disaster ended in 1996 with the High Court’s ruling
in Wik.74
A.

The Wik Decision Divided Aboriginal Property Rights into Two
Distinct Sets of Rights: Exclusive Rights and Coexistent Rights

The High Court’s decision in Wik75 erroneously modified native title’s
exclusionary property right by creating a new model of shared or coexistent
rights. By the slim majority of four to three, the Court held that while
pastoral leases did not grant exclusive ownership to the leaseholder, where
conflict between a pastoral lease and native title exists, native title rights
must yield to the rights of the pastoralist.76 The NTA explicitly extinguishes
native title rights when another owner holds the claimed property in freehold
title.77 The Wik case, however, presented a new question of native title that
neither Mabo nor the NTA definitively answered: whether a government-

68
The pastoral industry includes shepherds, herdsmen, and other workers directly involved in animal
husbandry. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 908 (2nd College ed. 1991).
69
See Wik, 187 C.L.R. at 2; RUSSELL, supra note 39, at 319-20.
70
See infra Part III.B.
71
See Noel Pearson, Paper presented at the High Court Centenary Conference, (October 9-11, 2003)
(Paper, titled Land Is Susceptible of Ownership, available through http://www.capeyorkpartnerships.com
/team/noelpearson/papers/NPlandSUSCEPTIBLE2003.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2008)); KENT MCNEIL,
EMERGING JUSTICE? ESSAYS ON INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN CANADA AND AUSTRALIA 415 (Houghton Boston
Printers 2001).
72
SEAN BRENNAN ET AL., TREATY 18 (2005).
73
Id.
74
RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 306.
75
Wik, 175 C.L.R. 1
76
Maureen Tehan, A Hope Disillusioned, An Opportunity Lost? Reflections on Common Law Native
Title and Ten Years of the Native Title Act, 27 MELB. U. L. 523, 553 (2003).
77
ANDREW ET AL., supra note 20, at 30. Freehold title is a property right granted to individuals by
the Crown and is, in terms of ownership rights, analogous to U.S. ownership rights associated with title
held in fee simple absolute. LISA STRELEIN, COMPROMISED JURISPRUDENCE: NATIVE TITLE CASES SINCE
MABO 39 (2006).
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issued pastoral lease was analogous to freehold title in its ability to
extinguish contravening native title claims.78
The prevailing legal view was that government-granted pastoral leases
extinguished native title.79 In 1994, the Federal Court of Queensland
confirmed this assumption in holding that conflicting pastoral leases
extinguished the native title claim of the Wik People80 after the Wik People
filed suit seeking native title recognition of their exclusive ownership to
more than 1600 square miles of land in Northern Queensland.81 Justice
Drummond, sitting for the Federal Court, held that pastoral leases conferred
exclusive possession and ownership to the pastoralists and extinguished “all
incidents of Aboriginal title or possessory title.”82
When a pastoral lease does not confer an exclusive property right to
the pastoralist, however, the lease does not extinguish native title.83 Instead,
the two distinct sets of rights are capable of coexisting and sharing
ownership rights to the property.84 In Wik, the High Court reversed the
Federal Court’s ruling and held that ownership rights to pastoral leases could
coexist with native title rights to the same land.85 The Court further held that
shared property rights existed even where the government leases failed to
predate Aboriginal title.86 In Wik, the State of Queensland had granted
leases to individual pastoralists, but failed to specify a right of exclusive
possession in the leaseholder.87 The High Court held that, for the sole
reason that the pastoral leases did not grant an exclusive property right, the
leases were not inconsistent with native title.88

78

RUSSELL, supra note 17, at 316.
See id. at 318.
80
Wik, 187 C.L.R. at 66.
81
Id. at 3.
82
Id. at 66.
83
Id. at 122.
84
Id. at 3. This form of coexistent property rights is not unlike the property rights associated with
tenancy in common under U.S. property law where each co-tenant has an undivided interest in the entire
parcel. See JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW, RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 640-41 (3rd ed. 2002).
85
Wik, 187 C.L.R. at 3. Interestingly, the court did not definitively answer the question of whether a
native title claim to land held under an expired pastoral lease could revert to exclusive Aboriginal
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The High Court’s decision subordinated native title property rights to
the interests of the pastoralist industry.89 The majority opinion emphasized
the importance to Australians of maintaining and protecting the pastoral
system.90 When the opinion was issued, roughly forty percent of the
Australian continent was under pastoral lease,91 and the Court’s decision
clearly reinforced the status quo. The High Court’s creation of coexistent
rights to pastoral leases failed, however, to emphasize the NTA’s mandate to
uphold and protect the Wik people’s native title rights.92 Instead, Wik
modifies Mabo and the NTA to create greater protection for Australia’s
pastoralists. Speaking for the majority, Justice Toohey explained that when
the traditional laws and customs of the Aboriginal group claiming the right
are inconsistent with the rights conferred on the pastoral lease grantee, “to
the extent of any inconsistency the [pastoralists] prevail.”93
B.

The Native Title Act Amendments Further Restricted the Ability of
Aboriginal People to Obtain Property Rights

The 1998 Native Title Act Amendments (“NTA Amendments”)94
deny Aboriginal people their full rights in asserting native title ownership of
traditional land and sea properties. In response to the High Court’s ruling in
Wik, the Australian government began work on a series of amendments to
the NTA.95 When first unveiled in April of 1997, Prime Minister John
Howard’s proposed amendments consisted of a “Ten Point Plan” that
provided greater security to pastoral and mining industry concerns regarding
the expense and potentially adverse outcome of prolonged native title
litigation.96 This “Ten Point Plan” eventually evolved into more than three
hundred pages of amendments to the NTA.97
The NTA Amendments substantially reduced native title rights and
severely limited the ability of Aboriginal groups to secure ownership of
89
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traditionally held land and sea properties. Among the most damaging of the
amendments were the limitations placed on the right to negotiate prior to the
enactment of future legislation, changes in the definition of what constituted
“future acts” under the right to negotiate, and increased threshold
requirements for the registration of new native title claims.98 These
limitations diminished both the area of land and sea claimable under native
title and the spectrum of future uses allowed upon recognized land and sea
properties.99
The NTA Amendments attempted, but ultimately failed, to clarify
when Crown acts extinguish native title and require the government to
provide just compensation to Aboriginal claimants. The NTA Amendments
divide Crown acts into two new categories: 1) acts of previous exclusive
possession and, 2) acts of previous non-exclusive possession.100 Acts of
previous exclusive possession, including Crown grants of freehold estates or
the construction of public works, completely extinguish native title and may
require just compensation.101 Acts of non-exclusive possession, such as
Crown grants of pastoral or agricultural leases, extinguish native title to the
extent of any inconsistency and do not invoke a just compensation
analysis.102 Since the enactment of the NTA Amendments, however, the
initial distinction between full and partial extinguishment has evolved into
an uncertain array of possibilities for native title that now includes
extinguishment, partial extinguishment, impairment, mere regulation, and
Crown acts with no legal effect upon native title rights.103
The NTA Amendments codified Wik’s inconsistency test. Whether a
land claim extinguishes a contravening native title claim depends on the
property rights granted to the holder of the land claim.104 If the land holder’s
property rights are non-exclusive, then there is no inconsistency between the
rights of the land holder and the rights and interests of the native title
claimant.105 A land holder’s non-exclusive property rights coexist with
Aboriginal native title rights and the rights of each property owner are
qualified only by the other co-owner. Neither set of property rights is
diminished nor qualified as against third parties.
98
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Native title property rights are partially or wholly extinguished when a
contesting land holder possesses an exclusive right in the same property.106
The extent to which the conflicting grant extinguishes any part of the native
title claim is determined by reference to the respective rights conferred—in
the case of the land holder by the grant and in the case of the native title
holder by the “traditions, customs and practices of the particular Aboriginal
group” claiming the right.107 This requires defining both the property rights
of the land holder and the property rights of the native title holder to
determine the extent of the conflict and the necessary extent of
extinguishment of native title rights. Only under this extinguishment branch
of the inconsistency test are the property rights of the native title holder
diminished as against third parties.
IV.

THE WRONGLY DECIDED CROKER ISLAND CASE CREATED A NONEXCLUSIONARY PROPERTY RIGHT THAT PERPETUATES DISPOSSESSION

The High Court’s 2001 decision in the Croker Island108 case
effectively extinguishes native title rights to offshore sea properties by
holding that such rights are entirely non-exclusionary. In 1994, Mary
Yarmirr and other traditional owners representing five Aboriginal clans of
the Yolngu People filed suit seeking recognition of their native title rights to
the offshore seas of the Croker Island region of the Northern Territory.109
This historic case was the first time Aboriginal people successfully brought a
native title claim to traditionally held sea properties into the Australian court
system.110 Despite successfully proving native title rights and interests that
included the traditional exercise of the right to exclude,111 the High Court
recognized entirely non-exclusive native title rights to the sea property.112
The High Court reached this erroneous decision because they failed to
follow the Wik precedent and ignored the mandate of the NTA.
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The High Court Failed to Follow Wik’s Inconsistency Test in Croker
Island

In 1994, Mary Yarmirr, together with five other Aboriginal claimants,
lodged a native title claim seeking “ownership and exclusive possession,
occupation, use and enjoyment”113 of the seas of the Croker Island region.114
The region, located in Australia’s Northern Territory, encompasses a series
of islands and coral reefs that are the traditional home of the MadilarriIldugij, Mangalarra, Muran, Gadurra, Minaga, Ngayndjagar, and Mayorram
peoples.115 These Aboriginal clans, as with all Aboriginal people of the
northeastern portion of Arnhem Land, collectively refer to themselves as the
Yolngu, a word meaning “human being.”116 For the Yolngu, the sea is an
integral part of their traditional laws and customs.117 The sea is represented
in stories of ancestors who come from the sea and move onto the land, along
the way creating the islands, reefs, and sandbars.118 The Yolngu connection
to the sea is further evident in their dependence upon fish and other marine
resources as a source of food and nutrition, for ceremonies, and for barter
and exchange.119
The Federal Court initially denied the Yolngu’s native title claim to
exclusive ownership of the Croker Island region based on a finding of
insufficient evidence. On appeal from the National Tribunal to the Federal
Court, Justic Olney held that while native title to the sea properties did exist,
the Yolngu had failed to provide sufficient evidence of the exclusivity of
their ownership.120 Justice Olney’s finding was based on the fact that the
Yolngu’s native title rights were affected by, and had yielded to, the right of
innocent passage and the common law right of the public to fish and
navigate.121 In his final ruling, Justice Olney applied the Wik inconsistency
test and held that the rights of the Yolngu to the use their traditional lands
113
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existed to the “extent of the inconsistency” such that they could not prevent
others from fishing or carrying out commercial activities in the area.122
Justice Olney’s findings, on appeal, were upheld by the full Federal Court.123
On final appeal to the High Court, the Yolngu argued for a qualified
exclusionary right to their traditional sea properties, but were again denied
any degree of exclusivity based on the lower court’s finding that they had
failed to assert their right to exclude non-Aboriginal people from the
region.124 The High Court, however, chose not to define the native title
rights possible under a qualified exclusionary right, thereby failing to apply
Wik’s inconsistency test to its analysis of the Croker Island claim. In so
doing, the Court did not follow established precedent and did not provide a
convincing rationale for its departure. The High Court did not define the
exclusivity of the contravening maritime rights as either entirely exclusive or
non-exclusive and refused to define the native title rights at issue as
precedent required. Instead, in deciding Croker Island, the High Court
created a new form of entirely non-exclusive ownership of Aboriginal
property.
Entirely non-exclusive native title is a right in name only as it fails to
confer significant property rights to Aboriginal people. The High Court
based its decision on a finding that existing maritime regulations were
inconsistent with, but did not extinguish, an indigenous exercise of the right
to exclude.125 This finding of inconsistency limited native title rights to
personal, domestic, or non-commercial activities for subsistence or cultural
purposes, and ensured access to areas of sea and the ability to protect places
of cultural and spiritual import.126 The Court affirmed native title rights
associated with subsistence, but failed to recognize any rights associated
with the management, ownership, and control of Aboriginal property. The
new form of native title failed to include a right to trade in the resources of
the sea, to manage these natural resources, or to prevent exploitation of those
resources by others.127
The High Court denied the Yolngu the right to exclude others from
their traditional offshore sea properties based on two erroneous
presumptions. First, the Court held that an exclusive right in sea property
122
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cannot be both legally recognized and qualified by maritime law.128 Current
examples of coexistent rights as well as examples of non-Aboriginal rights
in offshore sea properties, however, refute this faulty conclusion. Secondly,
the Court affirmed, without reexamining the evidence, that the Yolngu had
failed to establish that they had historically exercised a right of exclusion in
accordance with their traditional law and custom.129 Had the High Court
reviewed the Federal Court’s findings of fact in a light favorable to
Aboriginal people, they would easily have found proof of the traditional
exercise of the right to exclude.
The High Court, in bypassing Wik and relying instead on these two
erroneous presumptions, neither adequately explained nor supported its
holding. The High Court deferred to the Federal Court’s findings of fact that
the Yolngu did not exercise a right to exclude while both acknowledging
that maritime law could be qualified and refusing to decide whether the
recognized native title “fractured a skeletal principle of the legal system” as
required under Mabo.130 Based on case law precedent and the NTA, the
High Court had two available methods for deciding the Yolngu native title
claim: 1) apply the Wik test and find that the rights coexist, or 2) where an
inconsistency is found, apply the NTA’s framework to determine whether
native title had been extinguished. The High Court did neither, and its
newly created, non-exclusionary native title dramatically departs from both
of these two established methods.
The rights conferred under maritime law are not inconsistent with the
exclusive rights traditionally exercised by the Yolngu. Native title and
maritime law can coexist. The Court’s analysis fails in refusing to consider
the possibility of a qualified exclusionary right as put forth by the Yolngu in
their appeal, and as supported by Justice Kirby in his dissent.131 National
and international maritime laws protect public rights of access to the sea.
These public rights can coexist with a qualified exclusive native title right
because native title can be termed legally “exclusive” while being
effectively modified by both national and international maritime law.132 The
three maritime rights under contention, the public rights of fishing and
navigation, and the international right of innocent passage, therefore, do not
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prohibit recognition of native title as a qualified, but legally exclusive,
property right.
Native title, under a model of qualified exclusive possession,
empowers traditional owners to exclude some people from their sea property
while accepting those people genuinely exercising their public or
international maritime rights.133 National and international maritime laws
have not proven to be a barrier for non-aboriginal owners and thus should
not preempt Aboriginal ownership and native title to sea properties. For
instance, the public right of fishing may be regulated or abrogated by the
legislature.134 Exclusive fisheries grant exclusive rights to fish in a given
place qualified by the rights of navigation and innocent passage.135 Australia
recognizes exclusive rights in oyster beds as well as in leases of offshore
sea-beds136 that are qualified by the both the right of navigation and the right
of innocent passage.137
Conflicting property rights either coexist with native title or partially
or wholly extinguish native title. The High Court upheld the Federal Court
Judge’s findings of fact that effectively extinguished the Yolngu’s native
title rights.138 In so doing, the majority went out of their way to create a
new, unsupportable precedent. The majority explained that the public rights
to navigate and fish and the right of innocent passage “are rights which
cannot co-exist with rights to exclude from any part of the claimed area all
others.”139 The Croker Island majority erred in reasoning that it was not
necessary to examine the question of the right to exclude because such a
right was not extinguished by, but was inconsistent with, maritime law. This
ignores Wik’s precedent establishing that contravening property rights either
coexist or partially or wholly extinguish native title.140
The fact that exclusive native title rights can be qualified and coexist
with maritime law obligated the High Court to reexamine the Federal
Judge’s findings of fact regarding whether the Yolngu successfully
established their right to exclude. The NTA requires defining the content of
native title—the property rights conferred and protected—by the traditional
laws and customs of the specific Aboriginal group seeking legal recognition
of their title. Similarly, the High Court has stated that the content of native
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
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title rights depends on traditional law determined by the evidence
presented.141
The High Court acknowledged that the Yolngu had
successfully proven their native title rights and interests such that native title
was recognized.142 Defining this title without reference to the traditional law
and custom of the Yolngu does not, however, comply with the mandate of
the NTA. Because it is possible for a qualified exclusionary form of native
title to coexist with maritime law, it was imperative that the High Court
reevaluate whether the Yolngu in fact exercised an effective right to exclude.
B.

The High Court Failed to Uphold the NTA in Croker Island

The High Court also failed to uphold the express purpose of the NTA
in deciding Croker Island. The plain language of the NTA states that the
purpose of the NTA is to protect Aboriginal ownership of traditional
property, including inland waters and sea properties.143 Instead of protecting
Aboriginal property rights, however, the High Court not only denied
recognition of the rights traditionally exercised by the Yolngu of Croker
Island, but also labeled the effective extinguishment of those rights as mere
regulatory inconsistency.144 The Court wholly ignored the extinguishment
branch of the inconsistency test and removed the possibility of just
compensation.145
When Aboriginal claimants successfully prove the effective exercise
of a right to exclude, courts should not consider recognition of native title
absent this established right. Instead, the court should test the native title
rights for any inconsistency with contravening property rights.146 First,
courts must define native title property rights by examining the traditional
law and customs of the Aboriginal group seeking legal recognition of their
property rights.147 Second, in analyzing proof of the rights conferred by
traditional law and custom, courts must accommodate Aboriginal
perceptions of property and of the right to exclude.148 The NTA mandates
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this analysis.149 Furthermore, case law clarifies that native title is Aboriginal
law and is neither created nor defined by the common law.150
The High Court failed to effectuate the purpose of the NTA: to
protect recognized native title rights. The NTA’s Preamble states that the
Act seeks to rectify the consequences of past injustices by “securing the
adequate advancement and protection of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples . . . .”151 Section 3(a) defines one of the main objectives of
the NTA as “the recognition and protection of native title.”152 The High
Court has furthermore stated that the proper interpretation of Section
223(1)(c) of the NTA shows that “the Federal Parliament obviously set out
to protect and uphold the rights and interests of Australia’s indigenous
people.”153
Parliament clearly intended that the NTA include and protect
Aboriginal ownership of traditional sea properties. The NTA expressly
addresses and allows for the recognition of the native title rights and
interests of indigenous Australians to traditionally held sea properties.154
Part I of the NTA, the Preliminary Section, states that the NTA shall apply
and “extend . . . to the coastal sea of Australia and . . . to any waters over
which Australia asserts sovereign rights under the Seas and Submerged
Lands Act 1973.”155 This explicit language extends the reach of native title
to the twelve-mile mark that delineates the boundary of Australian
sovereignty over its coastal seas.156
The language of the NTA indicates Parliament’s intent to protect
native title rights to sea properties. In resolving a question of the
determination of native title rights, courts should turn first to the plain
language of the statute.157 This requires that courts, in interpreting the NTA,
read the Act as a whole and give regard to the NTA’s purpose of protecting
149
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indigenous native title rights to traditionally held land and sea properties.158
This commonly held logic was not lost on the entire High Court. Justice
Kirby stated in his dissent in Croker Island that the language and apparent
purposes of the NTA contradict the notion that the Act was “merely
repeating, or blindly and unquestioningly reflecting, pre-existing English,
Imperial, colonial or early Australian differentiations between land and sea
for legal purposes.”159
The indigenous people of Croker Island successfully established that
they possessed native title “rights and interests” as required by the NTA for
legal recognition of Aboriginal ownership of sea properties.160 Their claim
asserted exclusive ownership, occupancy, possession, and use of 3300
square kilometers161 of water, the subsoil beneath the waters, and all inherent
natural resources.162 The Aboriginal claimants satisfied Section 223 of the
NTA and thereby proved their right to exclusive ownership by
demonstrating that their rights and interests: 1) were possessed under
relevant traditional laws and customs; 2) were, by law and custom,
connected to the place in which the rights and interests existed; and 3) were
capable of recognition under the common law of Australia.163 For the
Yolngu of Croker Island, these traditional laws and customs included
protection of fishing, hunting, and gathering rights for both subsistence and
trade purposes. Traditional law and custom further required that visitors and
people from other indigenous groups gain permission prior to entering their
land and sea country.164
Reducing recognized native title to entirely non-exclusionary
ownership of sea properties fails to protect Aboriginal rights and negates the
purpose of the NTA. The petitioners’ complaint in Croker Island asked the
court to find that the indigenous people of the island had a recognized
entitlement to possession, occupation, use, and enjoyment of the sea and seabed within the claimed area to the exclusion of all others.165 In their
complaint, the Aboriginal people of Croker Island recited their traditional
laws and customs. These traditional laws and customs, particularly the right
of consultation, defined the scope of their native title claim to include the
right to exclude. Nonetheless, the High Court created a new form of native
158
159
160
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164
165

Id.
Id. at 112 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
The NTA § 223(1)(a)-(c).
Go-Ahead to 120 Claims, supra note 109, at para. 8.
See Levy, supra note 126.
See The NTA § 223(1)(a)-(c).
AIATSIS, supra note 115.
Id.

270

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 18 NO. 1

title, an entirely non-exclusionary right, which does not protect Aboriginal
rights and interests. As a result, this non-exclusionary right “means that
Croker Island traditional owners will have little say regarding developments
on their sea country.”166
THE CROKER ISLAND DECISION IGNORED EVIDENCE OF THE ABORIGINAL
LAW OF THE RIGHT TO CONSULTATION THAT IS ANALOGOUS TO THE
RIGHT TO EXCLUDE

V.

The Federal Court failed to recognize that the Aboriginal people of
Croker Island exercised exclusive possession over their land and sea
property because the Court narrowly focused on the Yolngu’s inability to
exclude European colonists.167 The Yolngu provided the Federal Court with
extensive evidence of their traditional exercise of the right to exclude.168
Had the High Court properly reviewed the findings of fact, it could have
rectified this wrong by considering how Aboriginal traditional law and
custom defines the right to exclude.
A.

The Evidence Reveals that the Aboriginal Law of the Right to
Consultation is Analogous to the Right to Exlude

For many Aboriginal groups, outsiders are expected to gain
permission prior to entering another clan’s country. The process of asking
and gaining permission is known as the “right to consultation” and is
synonymous with the clan’s right to exclude.169 This is true for the
indigenous people of Croker Island who continue to assert their right to
exclude, despite colonization, as the right to consultation in all decisions
concerning the access to, and the use of, their country.170 Unlike Australian
law, Aboriginal customary law on the right to exclude others from
traditional homelands defines the right in terms of holding, asserting, and
exercising responsibility for the welfare of country.171 Aboriginal land and
sea “ownership” is caring for clan territory.172 Deriving from this right to
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care for country is the right to consultation about entry onto country and the
right to allocate the use of country to others.173
Aboriginal clans enforce their right to exclude by requiring outsiders
to gain permission prior to entering or using the resources of a territory
belonging to another clan.174 A clan’s power to grant or deny entry to
traditionally held land and sea property is, in actuality, greater than the mere
right to exclude.175 This is because the power to grant or deny permission
includes not only the enforcement of proprietary rights to the land but also
entitles an Aboriginal clan to determine all uses of the land and its resources,
to define the cultural and ceremonial significance of the land, and to
determine how the property will be transmitted to descendents.176
The Aboriginal right to consultation is a proprietary right to exclude
analogous to the right held by property owners that possess fee simple or
freehold title to their land. In exercising their right to consultation,
Aboriginal clans are enforcing their right to use and enjoy their property, to
alienate their property as they see fit, and to exclude others from accessing
and using their land and resources. In property law, the exercise of these
rights indicates the exercise of a proprietary right.177 In exercising the right
to consultation, Aboriginal people claiming exclusive native title to their
traditionally held land and sea properties are asserting their right of
entitlement to exclude as against all others.
The right to exclude, even when it exists as the Aboriginal right to
consultation, requires the corollary ability to enforce that right. Aboriginal
enforcement of the right to control access to clan homelands involves the
placement of signs of occupation and the tracking of intruders.178 While
these methodologies become more difficult across vast tracts of land, they
are nearly impossible to implement over sea country.179 Instead, control of
access to sea country relies on visual monitoring and the assumption that as
travelers come into the enforcer’s field of vision they will travel directly
towards the enforcer to make their intentions known.180 A traveler who fails
to acknowledge the local right to consultation as the right to exclude is
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assumed to be acting with the malicious intent to commit trespass and will
be punished in accordance with the traditional law of the Aboriginal clan.181
Native title as an exclusive, proprietary right is automatically
extinguished where exclusive possession or occupation is interrupted for any
reason.182 Aboriginal claimants asserting a proprietary native title right are
therefore required to prove that their exclusive possession or occupation of
their property has been “asserted effectively.”183 This requirement of the
exercise of exclusive possession holds true even when it is the Australian
government that has forcibly removed Aboriginal people from their land.184
As explained by Aboriginal activist Noel Pearson, “Aboriginal people have
hitherto been trespassers on their own land by virtue of the fact that their
rights under the laws of white settlers have been obscured for two
centuries.”185
Without recognized native title, Aboriginal communities do not have
the autonomous power to enforce trespass actions under Australian law. The
assessment of native title claims to traditionally held land and sea properties
is based, in part, on both the historic and the modern ability to enforce
trespass actions. Yet, any inability to prosecute and punish trespassers has
led some Australian courts to accuse Aboriginal communities of failing to
exercise their right to exclude.186 This circular logic creates a conundrum
for Aboriginal claimants that is only resolved by viewing their traditional
right to consultation as analogous to the right to exclude. As Justice Kirby
noted in his dissent in Croker Island, “continual assertion of rights to be
consulted in decisions concerning access to, and use of, the claimants’
country may be the highest feasible level of assertion of control by a fishingbased society against Europeans where the latter were possessed of superior
arms and legal power.”187
B.

Croker Island Demanded a New Requirement of Aboriginal Claimants
that is Both Unjust and Unattainable

The majority decision in the Croker Island case set new precedent by
requiring that Aboriginal claimants not only have to prove the observance of
181
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traditional laws and customs amongst themselves, but also have to prove the
enforcement of such laws and customs against non-indigenous people.188
The majority reached this decision because they refused to review the
findings of fact made by the Federal Court judge.189 The High Court
deferred to the federal judge and relied on the findings of fact to reach their
conclusion that the Yolngu native title should be defined without the right to
exclude.190 The Federal Court, however, had declared that the facts not only
failed to establish the effective exercise of an exclusionary right, but
intimated the Yolngu’s native title rights were effectively extinguished.191
The High Court deftly avoided the Federal Court’s ruling, but refused to
review the evidence of the Yolngu’s exercise of the right to exclude on the
record.192 Confusingly, the majority appears to have rejected the Federal
Judge’s view that the Yolngu claim required proof of effective exclusion
against Europeans by saying, “Nor is it necessary to identify a claimed right
or interest as one which carries with it, or is supported by, some enforceable
means of excluding from its enjoyment those who are not its holders.”193
Unfortunately, in affirming the Federal Judge’s ruling, the High Court
established that very precedent.
Only Justice Kirby, viewing the right to consultation as analogous to
the right to exclude, appears to have at least considered that the High Court
might be required to review the Federal Judge’s erroneous findings of fact
regarding the Yolngu’s evidence of exclusivity:
To posit an obligation of the poorly armed forebears of the
claimants to assert against the balanda194 (and for that matter
the Macassans) . . . a right of physical expulsion, in order to
uphold their native title over their sea country, . . . is to define
the problem in terms of a desired outcome that would always be
unfavourable to the rights of persons such as the claimants.195
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Kirby argued that the ultimate purpose of the Mabo decision and the
subsequent enactment of the NTA was to reduce and remove the
discrimination against Aboriginal Australians that the law had previously
condoned and that the High Court had declared unjustifiable. Ignoring
evidence of the Yolngu’s exercise of the right to exclude, Kirby explained,
potentially reintroduced a discriminatory legal rule.196
Courts must first define and determine the rights exercised by
Aboriginal claimants in accordance with their traditional law and custom
when assessing native title claims to sea property.197 This fact-based
analysis includes accommodating Aboriginal concepts of the right to exclude
and realistically considering the limitations of the exercise of such a right
given more than two hundred years of colonization. In failing to correct the
Federal Court’s findings of fact, the majority in Croker Island erroneously
defined a new form of title not based on the requirements of the NTA.
Similarly, while Justice Kirby suggested that the findings of fact should have
been reviewed, he failed to recognize that such a review was the necessary
starting point for every analysis of native title recognition.
VI.

THE CROKER ISLAND DECISION SHOULD BE OVERTURNED

Under native title law, Aboriginal claimants must successfully prove
an effective assertion of the right to exclude to gain exclusive ownership of
their traditionally held land or sea property.198 This legal standard,
reaffirmed by the High Court in 2002,199 requires indigenous claimants to
prove that their traditional laws and customs included the exercise of the
right to exclude at the inception of Australian sovereignty. As explained by
Justice Brennan in Mabo, native title originates in, and is given its content
by, the traditional laws and customs observed by the indigenous people of a
territory.200 Native title rights are ascertained as a matter of fact by reference
to their laws and customs.201 The common law is, therefore, not obligated to
recognize an exclusive property right if the Aboriginal claimants failed to
effectively exercise their right to exclude.202 Where the evidence does
establish the effective exercise of the right to exclude, however, courts must
include the right to exclude in the bundle of recognized property rights.
196
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200
201
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Aboriginal Traditional Law and Custom Define the Native Title Rights
That the NTA Must Recognize and Uphold

The High Court recognized native title absent the ownership rights
that the Yolngu traditionally exercised. The Yolngu of Croker Island proved
that their traditional laws and customs defined their property rights to their
sea country as proprietary.203 Both the majority and Justice Kirby in his
dissent held that the claimants had provided the court with sufficient
evidence to establish that the Yolngu had maintained a “connection with the
lands or waters,”204 such that their native title “rights and interests are
recognized by the common law of Australia.”205 The NTA’s definition of
native title stipulates, however, that native title is, “the rights and
interests . . . possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the
traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples.”206 The NTA thus
requires that the recognized native title rights be defined by Yolngu
traditional law and include proprietary ownership.
The sui generis, or unique legal status, of native title requires that it be
defined by the traditional laws and customs of the Aboriginal group claiming
title because it cannot be defined by Australian common law. Common law
property rights do not create native title.207 Native title originates from and
is defined by the pre-contact legal order of Aboriginal people.208 As
explained by Justice Brennan in the Mabo decision, “Native title, though
recognized by the common law, is not an institution of the common law and
is not alienable by the common law.”209 Native title exists where it predates
the acquisition of Australian sovereignty and has not been subsequently
extinguished by the Crown. The role of the common law is, therefore, to
recognize historically practiced Aboriginal laws and customs “as an
embodiment of inherent and judicially cognisable bonds between Indigenous
peoples and their ancestral lands.”210
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A Non-Exclusionary Form of Title Not Based on Traditional Laws and
Customs is Not Native Title and Perpetuates Aboriginal Dispossession

Seven years after filing her native title claim to the offshore seas of
Croker Island, Mary Yarmirr walked out of the High Court of Australia with
a recognized native title that granted her fewer rights than she had
previously exercised. While her traditional law recognized the right to
exclude, the right to control use of and access to the natural resources of the
sea, and the right to use those resources for both trade and commercial
purposes, her newly recognized native title protected none of these
historically exercised rights.211 Instead, Mary Yarmirr and all the indigenous
inhabitants of Croker Island received a form of recognized native title that
merely affirmed their undisputed right to hunt, fish, and gather for
subsistence purposes.212
Native title that is not defined by the traditional laws and customs of
the Aboriginal group seeking recognition is not native title. Mary Yarmirr
asserted and proved an exclusive native title right.213 The creation of an
entirely non-exclusive property right by the majority of the High Court in
Croker Island,214 much like their creation of coexistent property rights in
Wik,215 served countervailing political interests at the expense of Aboriginal
rights.216 By claiming that national and international maritime law made the
exercise of an exclusive Aboriginal property right in the sea impossible,217
the High Court chose to protect the rights of the fishing and pearling
industry instead of adhering to the statutory language of Section 223 of the
NTA.
The High Court’s decision also deftly avoided the complicated
question of compensation, which would have arisen had it held that national
and international maritime law extinguished native title. The NTA’s
compensation regime for extinguishment of native title is extraordinarily
complex.218 Determination of compensation is governed by Section 13(2) of
the NTA and only applies to extinguished native title.219 To date, the first
211

See supra Part IV.A.
AIATSIS, supra note 115.
See supra Part V.A.
214
Yarmirr, 208 C.L.R. at 3.
215
Wik, 175 C.L.R. at 243.
216
See supra Part III.
217
Yarmirr, 208 C.L.R. at 67.
218
Jango v. Northern Territory (2006) 152 F.C.R. 150, 165; see Minter Ellison, Native Title Act
Unclear on Approach to Compensation, Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.hg.org/articles/article_1373.html (last
visited Sept. 20, 2008).
219
Jango, 152 F.C.R. at 166.
212
213

JANUARY 2009

ENTITLED AS AGAINST NONE

277

and only case to reach the Australian courts on the question of compensation
for extinguishment of native title is the 2006 case of Jango v. Northern
Territory.220 In Jango, a federal court denied the Aboriginal claimants
compensation, finding that the evidence did not demonstrate a consistent and
sustained pattern of observance of their traditional laws and customs.221 The
court denied compensation to the Yankunytjatjara and Pitjantjatjara people
of the Northern Territory because they failed to prove the existence of their
native title.222
The High Court recognized the existence of the Yolngu’s native title
rights to their offshore sea properties, but stripped valuable property
rights.223 Based on the recent holding in Jango, had the High Court
extinguished the Yolngu’s native title claim, instead of declaring it nonexclusive due to regulatory inconsistency, the claim could have undergone
an extinguishment analysis. Such an extinguishment analysis could have
resulted in the Yolngu receiving compensation for the loss of their property
rights. Compensation, while not the ideal of obtaining exclusive ownership
of traditional property, goes further towards ending Aboriginal dispossession
than native title absent meaningful property rights. Instead of fulfilling the
NTA’s mandate to “rectify the consequences of past injustices,”224 the High
Court’s decision in Croker Island perpetuates more than two hundred years
of denying property rights to indigenous Australians.
Croker Island set an unjust precedent for all native title claims to sea
properties.225 Since its ruling in 2001, the High Court has not accepted
another native title case involving an appeal of a sea property claim. In the
most recent case to be ruled on, the 2007 case of Gumana v. Northern
Territory,226 the Federal Court effortlessly held that the recognized native
title of the Aboriginal people of Blue Mud Bay did not confer an exclusive
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property right.227 The Federal Court’s sole reason for its holding was the
precedent established by the High Court in Croker Island.228
Nonetheless, Aboriginal peoples are continuing to fight for
recognition of their native title rights to their traditionally held sea
properties. As of December 31, 2007, the National Tribunal had eighty-four
active native title claims that included sea properties.229 The Aboriginal
struggle for sovereignty and recognized ownership of traditionally held sea
properties will continue until the High Court overturns Croker Island, the
Australian government upholds the promise of Mabo, and until the NTA
recognizes, respects, and legally protects Aboriginal law and custom.
C.

Reversing Croker Island Would Promote Aboriginal SelfDetermination

Land rights play a critical role in the fight for Aboriginal selfdetermination.230 Viewed in light of this ongoing struggle for selfdetermination, native title claims to traditionally held land and sea properties
are both an assertion of property rights and an assertion of sovereignty.231
Prior to Mabo, the concept of terra nullius was the linchpin that recognized
Crown ownership of all land and sea property across the Australian
continent and acted to “dispossess, degrade and devastate the Aboriginal
people.”232
Native title, properly applied, can rectify Aboriginal
dispossession of land. Furthermore, native title can secure the advancement
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders through recognition of Aboriginal
law and sovereignty over traditionally held land and sea properties.233
Native title recognizes not just Aboriginal rights and interests in
traditionally held land and sea properties, but also recognizes the autonomy
of Aboriginal legal traditions.234 Native title, under both the NTA and
Mabo, is a property right defined by the traditional laws and customs of the
227
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Aboriginal group asserting legal recognition.235 Formal recognition of
native title therefore promotes Aboriginal sovereignty by acknowledging
distinct indigenous interests in land and sea properties and facilitating selfdetermination.236 To fulfill the purpose of the NTA and rectify past
injustices committed against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples,
native title must, therefore, promote Aboriginal sovereignty.
Overturning the Croker Island decision would promote Aboriginal
sovereignty and help end Aboriginal dispossession. Since Wik, the High
Court has continually eroded native title property rights in response to
industry lobbying and the efforts of conservative politicians.237 This assault
on native title perpetuates dispossession and fails to uphold the promise of
Mabo and the mandate of the NTA. In order to fulfill his election promise
of ensuring reconciliation between Aboriginal and white Australians, Prime
Minister Kevin Rudd must do more than merely apologize for past
injustices—he must end the current, ongoing dispossession of property from
Aboriginal people. The High Court continues to adhere to the erroneous
analysis of Aboriginal law and custom established in Croker Island.238
Parliament, guided by Prime Minister Rudd’s vision of an Australia where
all citizens are equal,239 must reaffirm that when an Aboriginal group
successfully provides evidentiary proof of a traditionally practiced right to
exclude, native title will recognize and protect that exclusionary right to
ownership of both traditional land and sea properties.
VII. CONCLUSION
Aboriginal property rights extend not only to land, but to surrounding
coastlines, intertidal zones, and offshore seas. This title is not a title of mere
occupancy but includes the right to exclusive use of the sea property, its
inherent resources, and the right to exclude others. Where an Aboriginal
group can successfully prove that its traditional laws and customs include
the effective exercise of the right to exclude, native title should confer
proprietary rights to the claimed area whether the traditional area is a land or
sea property. Recognition of native title based on traditional law and custom
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upholds the purpose of the NTA and is the clear mandate of the NTA based
on the plain language of the statute.
Court decisions, such as the Croker Island decision, that recognize a
form of title that is entirely non-exclusionary do not recognize native title.
Instead, such decisions effectively extinguish Aboriginal rights that predate
European colonization.
This extinguishment threatens Aboriginal
sovereignty, impedes reconciliation between Aboriginal and white
Australians, and fails to rectify more than two hundred years of Aboriginal
dispossession. Overturning the Croker Island precedent would be a small
but necessary step towards creating a new Australia where indigenous and
European cultures are equally valued.

